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Abstract: This paper introduces the concept of the VSM method being used to represent the organization of 
NPPs in responding to accidents.  The Fukushima accident is addressed as a method for the examination of 
the VSM method and its utility is seeing the ‘big’ picture as far as the decision-making aspects of 
organizations are concerned.  The impact of accidents upon the NPP management operations is covered and 
how the organization has to change following an accident is covered.  The paper points out the fact that often 
accident situations and their responses are affected by the long term decisions of management.  The decision 
of TEPCO to disregard advice on the possibility of a large tsunami occurring was a critical fault and 
preventive methods should have been considered along with the risk of not taking actions.  
Recommendations are made for improvements in emergency procedures during accident control and 
mitigation, the procedures should be flexible and based upon something like the symptom-based procedure 
approach and should consider beyond design-basis events. 
 
Keywords: Accidents, Organizations, Safety, VSM 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is concerned with the influence of accidents on the development of nuclear power organizations.  
It should be noticed that significant changes have occurred over time in the operation of nuclear plants, most 
of these changes have been initiated in response to accidents.  Some of the accidents have had a stronger 
influence than others. 
 
The paper not only deals with the impact of accidents on the way that nuclear power plant organizations are 
organized, but also covers how these organizations could be modelled based on a cybernetic model of 
organizations developed by Beer [1].  Most accident studies are based upon models of NPPs coupled with 
limited operator models, but the inclusion of management decision-making is omitted.  Here plant models 
including automatic control and protection modules are connected to the Beer model called Viable Systems 
Model (VSM).  During an accident the normal VSM Nuclear Power Plant Organizational model morphs into 
a compact VSM and this process is discussed in the context of the Daiichi TEPCO NPP accident induced by 
earthquake/tsunami during March 2011. 
   
The normal focus of interest associated with accidents seems to be the operators, who are persons seen to be 
most closely involved with the accident and the organization’s response to the accident.  In fact, the situation 
is more complicated than that.  Reviews of accidents indicate that top decision-makers in organizations have 
a great deal of responsibility in setting up the environment that makes the accident more likely.  This is the 
case in the Daiichi accident. 
 
The paper explores this topic to try to understand the limitations of nuclear organizations that cause this to 
happen.  Several authors have advanced reasons why top management makes decisions that eventually lead 
to the accidents.  For example, Marc Gerstein [2] has advanced the idea that managers fail to carryout a 
considered risk assessment.  Often he suggests analyses offered up by experts may be inconclusive.  He 
states that in management decision-making intuition often trumps knowledge.  Here he was referring to a 
particular situation; the case of the NASA Columbia accident due to the impingement of iced foam on the 
carbon leading edge of the wing.  It was the lack of action by management to try to resolve what might have 
happened and what could they do to recover the astronauts.  
 
Having an integrated view of organization in controlling the plant should help in avoiding accidents. 
Management should be in a position to understand how accidents affect the plant and be proactive in 
preventing accidents rather than waiting for accidents to occur before taking steps, particularly in the case of 
severe accidents?  One would have thought that the consequences would have been powerful enough to 
cause organizations to take steps to reduce risks.  Well, maybe the answer is that organizations cannot 
achieve the goal of improving plant safety independently of accidents.  Why is it that the industry is still 
surprised when a new accident occurs? 
 
If one looks at the industry as a whole, we have regulators deeply involved looking at every misstep, we have 
Institute of Nuclear Plant Operations (INPO) and World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) helping 
utilities to improve their operations and then we have US National Laboratories and Universities deep into 
theories and ideas, yet accidents pop up and change the way we think about the situation. 
 
One could just wave ones hands and say this is the fate of mankind to dream the impossible dream, and 
nature will point out our limitations.  It has been pointed out, that the people involved in trying to solve these 
problems themselves seem to have a common mode of thinking; hence the solution depends on thinking 
differently.  If one steps back, one sees that progress in life in all fields is dominated by this kind of effect, 
the inability to see all interacting issues to understand the weakness of a specific approach, or some part of it.  
Sometimes, the way that society works precludes the ability of individuals to see clearly what are the issues 
controlling risk.  Then they focus on the wrong items/people.  In the story about the King’s new clothes, it 
was a child that saw the truth.  So what do we have to do?  Become aware of our limitations and cast the 
issues in a new light     
The size limitations of paper does not allow for full explanation about the development of VSM and 
descriptions of accidents.   
 
2.  VSM AND A CYBENETIC VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The purpose of this section is to present information on the use of Viable Systems Model (VSM) developed 
by Beer [1] and its application to management organizations running high reliability organizations (HRO). 
Beer based his VSM model on the science of cybernetics.  Cybernetics is the study of the structure of 
regulatory or control systems, which are seen in animals as well as in business systems.   Cybernetics is 
closely related to control system theory.  An introduction to the underlying techniques of cybernetics is given 
in Ashby [3].  Cybernetics is considered to be equally applicable to organization and control of physical as 
well as social management systems.  VSM is a method to underpin understanding of management dynamics 
in organizations based upon cybernetics. 
 
VSM was proposed as a better way of understanding and diagnosing organizational behaviour.  The 
approach has been applied to manufacturing, food distribution, Walker, [4], software development by 
Herring and Kaplan [5], etc.  VSM was applied by Beer to government operations in Chile under President 
Allende, circa 1970-73.  A closer application of VSM closer to Nuclear Power was one which applied it to 
air traffic management (ATM) in Saudi Arabia [6].  The main thrust of this paper is the application VSM to 
the consideration of safety of nuclear power plants. 
 
In practice a detailed form of VSM is used to illustrate some managerial and supervisory aspects of 
organizations.  Figure 1 shows such a version of VSM that will be used in relation to utility management and 
associated personnel when considering the impact of accidents on management.  It is useful, rather than 
getting caught up in the minutia of organization charts to select a compact model in order to show the 
dynamic relationships between the core working levels of an organization. 
 
One can see here that the management function is represented by S5, S4 and S3, the communications are 
represented by S2 and S3* and operations by the S1 groups (both supervisors and operators).  The 
environment is made up of local and global effects.  The environment covers public and the regulators.  S3, 
S4 and S5 represent the top management functions of top management (CEO and President), planning 
(Safety & Risk assessment-CNO), economics (CFO) and plant management (Station Manager, VP).  The 




Figure 1. Complex Version of VSM 
 
The VSM model of a utility organization is shown as a system to control and monitor a power plant.  The 
organization acts like a layered control system with some controllers acting directly on the process and 
others controlling the set points of local controllers.   
 
Here decisions are made at different levels within the organization; to meet the long term objectives of the 
company are covered by the top management, planning and risk assessments at the CNO level and at the 
plant management level decisions are made relative to the day to day running of the plant.  The plant 
operators and supervisors are the persons committed to actually running the plant equipment.   
 
Feedback is provided to the various elements by plant data, information from audits and from operators.  It is 
this feedback that stabilizes the plant operations much the same as in a regular control scheme.  Also there 
are internal feedback signals from the managerial levels that also ensure that top level decisions are exposed 
to critical review and comment.   
 
It not always clear to top management, that the functional stability and responsiveness of an organization is 
dependent on all of these feedback signals.  In fact, many may not even be recognized.   Accidents can be  
examined to show how deficiencies within organizations can lead to accidents and even to the demise of 
organizations, for example see the failure of Northeast Utilities recorded in MacAvoy and Rosenthal [7]. 
  
3. ACCIDENT ISSUES   
 
Accident case studies can be used to shed light on how organizations operate and what are the rules required 
to ensure that the whole organization works safely and economically.  In studying the forces at play in an 
accident, one may come to the conclusion that in some cases it is the interactions of a small group of persons 
(supervisors and operators) and in other cases it is the decisions the top managers that leads to an accident.    
 
The VSM approach is used here to capture these various interactions, in order to understand both the causes 
of the accident and its propagation.  Nuclear accident analysis is key part of this paper in that lessons can be 
learned from these and other accidents, but there is no space for many analyses here.  The focus will be on 
the Fukushima Accident, March, 2011.  The Fukushima accident is likely to have a large effect on both the 
Japanese Government and Utilities, and also send strong messages to other countries.  The Tsunami caused 
devastation of the area around and north of where the NPPs were located.  Thousands were killed and their 
property destroyed, roads swept away and rail transport ceased along with a loss of communications.  In the 
surrounding areas, people were killed and injured, houses were damaged, transportation affected, cars 
washed out to sea, etc.  It is believed that in somewhere in excess of 20,000 people died and more than 
110,000 houses were destroyed principally by the action of the tsunamis.  Loss of life due to the nuclear 
plant accidents was very small, but there was a high economic loss and a long clean-up process because of 
the radioactivity releases.    
 The Fukushima accident took place in Japan on March 11
th
, 2011 and affected a number of nuclear plants 
operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company.  The plants were the six units of the Daiichi station and 
Daini station and are about 160 miles north of Tokyo on the north-east coast.  The four of the six plants that 
made up the Daiichi were the ones principally affected.  The accident was caused by large earthquakes and 
later followed by enormous tsunamis.  The largest earthquake and the some of the tsunamis exceeded the 
design bases for the nuclear power plants (NPPs).   
 
A large seismic event (Richter Scale 9.0) occurred on March 2011 off the north-east coast of Japan followed 
by a series of tsunamis (7) and caused massive amount of damage including affecting electric power 
distribution and led to the automatic shutdown of the Fukushima NPPs (Daiichi and Daini).  This was a 
correct response. The standby diesels started up and the plants were operating safely.  Of the six NPPs of 
Daiichi only units #1, #2 and #3 were operating the other three NPPs were shutdown. 
 
The INPO report [8] is a very detailed analysis/accounting of the accident, but does not address questions 
related to why certain actions were or were not taken.    Of interest is that it states that several after-shocks of 
lower magnitude occurred before the waves of tsunamis arrived at the coast.  One of the waves was 
approximately 46 to 49 feet (14 to 15 meters) based on water level indications on the buildings.  The design 
basis tsunami was 18.7feet (5.7meters), so the largest tsunami was well above this design basis, and this was 
the base cause of the extensive damage to plants and also to the surrounding area.   
 
The earthquake and Tsunami magnitudes exceeded the design bases for the NPPs.  It has been reported that 
seismic experts had informed TEPCO that higher tsunami should have been selected [9].  Sea water flooding 
caused by the tsunami caused the standby power diesels to fail, the diesel fuel tanks to be blown away, 
battery rooms, and turbine halls to be flooded.  There were some diesels were air started, but could not be 
used since rest of the electrical systems had failed.  The inlet cooling system structures became blocked with 
the debris caused by the tsunamis and led to cooling water pump failures. 
 
The loss of diesels and battery supplies led to the plant being in a “Blackout” condition.     Initially, the 
diesels started and then stopped due to flooding at the diesel locations.  Initially the reactors shut down 
(control rods inserted into the reactor core), the auxiliary electric supplies via the diesels came on and decay 
heat removal was taken care of.  There may have been some damage from the earthquake, but it did not lead 
to extensive damage at the plant.   
 
However, within an hour of the earthquake the tsunami struck and from then onwards, the safety systems 
failed, the batteries failed to supply instrument power to allow valves to be operated.  Under these 
conditions, it was nearly impossible to prevent core damage and loss of cooling to the spent fuel pools.  The 
crews’ only action was to try to reduce the pressure in the reactors to a point where they could use fire pumps 
to inject water (initially fresh water then sea water) into the core.  Even trained operators, with a well 
developed emergency plan, would have a great difficulty in knowing what to do and they had very little time 
to act before the cores would be damaged, leading to possible radiation releases and hydrogen explosions.   
 
The site superintendent was involved in the stabilization process, but it appears that the emergency 
procedures that they were practiced in were not designed to deal with such difficulties.  Confusion abounded 
in the plant, around the plant and resources to help the personnel were not readily available.   
 
Early reports were classical in that they focused on the accident sequence.  Giving information about what 
was going on, such as hydrogen explosions occurring, and radiation releases, etc, but very rarely does one 
get a glimpse of what was happening as far as instructions to operators from plant management, TEPCO 
upper management, and the Japan Government, etc.  Of course instructions might have had little effect 
initially, in that the plant was already in a state where the operators could not determine what actions to take, 
since there was no electric power and battery power to instruments and controls also quickly disappeared.  
Truly, not only was the plant in a ‘black out’, but so were the operational staff.   
 
TEPCO’s top management seemed to be out of touch during the early stages of the accident.  It is presumed 
that advice and help was slow in arriving.  The Japanese government was deeply involved in trying to 
establish control over the affected surrounding regions.    It was a catastrophic event for the people of Japan.  
It is little wonder that even the issue of a reactor disaster was not immediately given enough attention and 
resources to terminate the accident and mitigate the effects of core damage.  In some ways, the site personnel 
did very well to stay and try to address problems.  Is not clear whether NPP staff and managers recognized 
the possibility that given the failure of fuel cooling, that the water covering the fuel would boil away and the 
fuel cladding would heat up and react with the steam and form hydrogen.  Photos of the reactor buildings 
indicate that hydrogen explosions had taken place.  Later, ground personnel were seen pumping water in the 
direction of the spent fuel pools, which are high up in the remains of the reactor building. 
 
The general impression is that local NPP personnel were overwhelmed by events but were trying their best to 
cope with the situation.  TEPCO headquarters’ personnel could not help to improve the situation.  
Subsequently, radioactivity spread throughout the area.  Some of it was airborne and some leaked from the 
reactor building and spent fuel pools.  The full story is not yet available as to where all of the sources were 
located.  It is believed that some parts of the reactor vessel and its containment system were impacted by the 
earthquake and a leakage path to the sea could have come from here as well as other locations.  It will be 
some time before a complete account of the accident sequence and the sources of radioactive releases are 
agreed. 
 
The INPO report [7] covers some of the difficulties that the site personnel had in trying to tackle the 
consequence of the accident.  Some of the difficulties are; locations were dark, radiation was high is some 
places, equipment was not working, earthquake aftershocks caused vibrations and the threat of explosions 
existed.  Roads made impassable with debris and even oil tanks were moved by the force of the tsunami, the 
station staff tried very hard against odds to cool the reactors.  The loss of power affected not only pumps and 
valves, but lighting and availability of instrumentation, for example the staff did not know the water level in 
the reactors.  The crews scrambled to recover and used car batteries to connect instruments to determine 
reactor water level.  As a side issue, it is considered that this information was erroneous due to voiding in the 
reference legs of the level instruments.   
 
The site personnel were faced with a situation in which nothing worked, the question was what pieces of 
equipment could be placed into some degree of working condition and what did one have to take to 




The representation of an organization by VSM has been explained.  The VSM models the decision and 
control functions of a NPP organization along with the maintenance, test and calibration actions taken by the 
station personnel.  There are of course other functions carried out by station personnel, but here the focus is 





  Figure 2 Integrated Depiction of Plant, Management and other Influences 
 
Over the years, accidents have had an impact on the structure and the function of the separate entities within 
an organization.  Some accidents have had a greater impact than others.  For example, the whole concept of 
role of the operators, their training and displays for operators was changed by the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
accident.  It is expected that the Fukushima accident will have a similar effect.  VSM NPP model integrated 
with the plant, the plant controls and protection systems along with internal and external accident initiators 
yields a useful dynamic model of most of the interactions.  This integrated model gives one a better tool to 
examine the role of management decision-making as it related to accident causality, termination and 
mitigation.  Figure 2 depicts such an integrated plant/VSM model, INPO, NRC and disturbances. 
 
Following accidents, lessons are learned and implemented by the actions of utility industry.  In the case of 
TMI, the short comings of the industry were revealed in the Kemeny report [10], and the NRC followed this 
with an action plan to incorporate suggestions on how to improve the industries’ performance.  The Industry 
also acted to fill a void in the relative responsibilities of individual utilities to the industry by the forming the 
Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).  These changes and the role of the NRC can be incorporated 
into a modified version VSM, whereby feedback and feed forward signals representing these two bodies.  




   Figure 3: Depiction of the Improvement Pathway 
 
 It is expected that Fukushima will lead to further changes in the industry.  One can see among the changes, 
the introduction of a FEMA like function to assist in bringing resources to help combat the effects of 
widespread dislocations in transportation and help with getting extra staff, electrical materials (cables, 
batteries, generators, etc), and defining the morphing process to reduce full staff to the emergency response 
team.    
An examination of the integrated systems figure shows the influence of various decision-making entities 
within the organization.  The top management’s effects are long term, whereas those of the operators are 
more or less instantaneous.   
 
Another change that was observable was the change from a loose large TEPCO organization at the start of 
the Fukushima accident into a tight plant directed organization.  This seemed to evolve under the direction of 
the site supervisor.  The basic structure remained a VSM type of organization with control and decision-
making by the site supervisor with operators taking actions.  This model morphed from the large integrated 
VSM model in figure 2 into the tight VSM model depicted in figure 4.  Although the TEPCO management 
and even the Prime Minister were involved the main burden was with the site personnel.  They had to evolve 
procedures and processes as they went along in the accident.   
    
    Figure 4. Emergency Daiichi Organization 
 
Clearly, there is a need to do two things: develop a well based emergency procedure for dealing with known 
severe accidents plus a generalised procedure for dealing with unknown accidents, maybe complex 
accidents, somewhat along the lines of the symptom-based procedures.  The requirement is to be prepared 
for all eventualities, loss of power, breakdown in communications, loss of transportation, fires, radiation, and 
the loss of experienced personnel and blockages of access to controls.  These were some of the set of 
circumstances that occurred during the Daiichi accident.  Also, carrying out preparatory work of this kind 
could determine what resources are needed that could be coordinated with other organizations and what 
training is needed by station staff. 
 
If one looks at the roles of the utility management, NRC and INPO, we see that they cover a number of 
different, overlapping functions.  The NRC is there to regulate the industry, learn from other accidents and 
near accidents affecting the general state of the industry; INPO has access to similar data, but also has closer 
contacts with the utility and does look operator training.  It also performs reviews if invited to do so by the 
utility and also advises utility on operator training.  The utility is focused on running NPPs efficiently and 
operating within NRC parameters for safety with the major decisions made by the CEO.  A key role within 
the utility is the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO).  The CNO’s function is to be concerned with the safety 
aspects of operating NPPs.  
 
In the VSM model, there is a function, within the management that looks at planning and considering how 
the organization should change in order to be prepared for environmental changes.  Beer was thinking about 
market changes that the organization has to respond to.   In the utility this function should be carried out by 
the CNO, especially as far as safety is concerned.  Somewhere in the utility organization the risk factors 
related to both external and internal induced events should be considered and actions promulgated to 
minimize public health and economic risks.   
 
In the case of the Fukushima accident, it appears that the process of considering risk was not taken far 
enough by the top TEPCO management.  In discussions about risk and making decisions the matter is often 
decided in words of Gerstein [2]; “Unsubstantiated intuition had just trumped inconclusive analysis.”  So 
the idea that there was a high probability of a large tsunami occurring sometime soon affecting the 
Fukushima NPPs was decided to be ignored and therefore the seawalls were too small, and flood protection 
for the diesels, batteries and electrical circuits, which would have helped ensure the reactors would not 
destroyed, was not taken.  The inference from Gerstein’s comment is that the decision-makers can intuitively 
know what can work without any form of risk analysis.  This type of decision-making crops up again and 
again.  It is a case of ‘don’t confuse me with facts, my mind is made up’!  Sometimes an analysis of the 
situation is inconclusive, this does not mean that one should just go ahead as though all is acceptable but 
rather one should look at the consequences of making and not making a decision and then re-examine the 
situation.   
 
In the case of TEPCO’s decision not to improve the tsunami defences, a careful review might have indicated 
the need, as a minimum, to waterproof the diesels and prevent flooding of electrical gear.  Some of the 
diesels could have been moved to higher ground, watertight doors could have been fitted, and the procedures 
for the emergency crews (morphed teams) could have been thought through.  Other tactics could have been 
examined to reduce risk given that a large tsunami could hit the units.  A risk reduction-cost benefit study in 
this case could have been carried out to determine which changes yields the best approach to reduce the risk 
to a level that is acceptable to the utility and the country.      
 
The integrated plant/VSM model pulls together the all of the actors in the representation so that the roles of 
all parts can be examined in terms their contribution to ensuring a good outcome given the occurrence of an 
external or internal event.  The size of the disturbance can be varied to see where risks increase rapidly and 
why.  
 
5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
NPP organizations are living organisms and as such are dynamic.  The paper has shown the need to 
understand the relationship between decisions made and actions taken.  The methods used and regulation 
actions taken seemed to have concentrated rather on actions taken at the ‘sharp end’ rather than at the ‘blunt 
end’, i.e. more holding operators responsible as opposed to decision-makers.   
 
Coupling of the VSM model with the power plant and the disturbances should bring home the fact that 
management decisions play a key role in the dynamic control of NPPs, even though they might not be 
immediately apparent.  The time scale for decision-making is not the same as the operators’ responses to an 
accident.  In fact, accident progressions maybe affected by decisions made by management many years 
earlier, for example the management decision, made by NASA on transportation costs, led to the jointed 
booster design for the Shuttle.  The subsequent decision by NASA to launch in cold conditions cemented the 
certainty of an accident.   
 
However, the role of the decision-makers is very clear in the case of the Fukushima accident, both in not 
providing adequate defences and not having in place good emergency procedures accompanied by adequate 
tools to assist the crews stem the effects of the accident.  The crews appear to have done a credible job along 
with the site manager of tackling an impossible job.   
 
It seemed that for every step forward, there was one step back caused by the accident progression moving 
faster than the crews’ actions to negate the effects of the accident.  Trying to develop ways of responding 
under these conditions is very difficult.  A well thought out and practiced emergency plan along with the 
required tools would have helped minimize the effects of the tsunami, but ultimately would not have saved 
the situation.  The key decision not taken by TEPCO management was to consider the seriousness of the 
tsunami threat and take the appropriate actions.  In designing control systems, one always explores the 
boundaries where instability maybe encountered and then designs the system in a way to avoid these zones.   
 
The study of the Daiichi accident has brought home the need for management to think beyond the design 
basis events as far as accident emergency procedures are concerned.  A more generalized approach to 
accident control and mitigation needs to be evolved along the lines of the symptom-based procedures.  There  
is a need to be more concerned with unlikely accidents or complex accidents instead of being stuck with 
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